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Policy 
pointers
Efforts to formalise 
artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM) by 
registering property-like 
mining claims typically 
benefit wealthier and more 
powerful individuals.
Formalisation efforts 
need to be more inclusive 
of those ‘at the bottom’ of 
the labour structure, who 
are often vulnerable to 
exploitation and 
marginalisation.
Developing ‘inclusive’ 
formalisation schemes, 
which can offer benefits to 
workers, employers and 
government alike, will 
require a thorough 
understanding of existing 
labour arrangements, and 
how risks and benefits are 
distributed. 
A case study describes 
seven challenges facing 
efforts to formalise ASM in 
the Philippines, and 
potential policy responses 
to these.
Artisanal and small-scale 
mining: protecting those ‘doing 
the dirty work’
Informal labour is a defining characteristic of artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM), and is seen as an underlying cause of many social and 
economic challenges facing the sector. Approaches to formalising ASM 
mostly consider it a poverty-driven subsistence activity and take legalistic 
approaches, emphasising the need to recognise local people’s property 
claims. But these policy responses can misunderstand the complex and 
multi-tiered labour structure that exists within informal ASM. More inclusive 
formalisation policies are needed — policies that particularly seek to 
understand and improve the position of ASM’s large, mobile and often 
marginalised workforce. Using empirical evidence from the Philippines, we 
identify the opportunities and challenges posed by a more inclusive 
approach to formalising ASM, and recommend potential policy responses.
Despite government attempts to formalise 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), informality 
remains one of the sector’s defining features. 
Informality and ineffective government regulation 
is often associated with problems including health 
risks, child labour, environmental degradation, and 
armed conflict over ‘lootable’ mineral wealth. 
While some operating in the sector still see ASM 
as dominated by opportunistic fortune-seekers, 
many more see a poverty-driven subsistence 
sector with few ‘barriers to entry’ other than a 
pick, a shovel and a strong back.1 This ‘poverty-
driven narrative’ is akin to ‘dualist’ notions that 
treat ASM as a safety net running alongside 
formal employment in large-scale mining and 
providing income to the poor and the unemployed 
in times of crisis.  
Where governments have brought ASM under 
regulatory control, policy often emphasises 
issuing licences to extract minerals from a 
particular area. But such efforts to formalise 
mineral tenure often don’t regulate the 
increasingly complex labour systems that now 
characterise ASM in many countries, and thus fail 
to protect a massive and vulnerable labour force. 
Indeed, explanations for why formalisation efforts 
frequently fail often take a legalistic approach,2 
arguing that persistent informality stems from the 
formal sector’s exclusive and elitist character. 
They point out that various entry barriers (for 
example, registration costs, complex 
formalisation procedures, remote state agencies) 
stop poor and undereducated ASM-operators 
formalising their businesses, and instead benefit 
the rich and powerful. This may well be true, but 
treating ASM as a homogeneous subsistence 
sector misses much variation.
Taken together, dualist and legalist notions of ASM 
as a predominantly informal activity feed into policy 
recommendations aimed at simplifying and 
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‘democratising’ registration procedures, and 
setting aside land where ASM can operate legally. 
Alternative ways to understand 
ASM’s informality
In many countries, subsistence mining persists 
alongside more capitalised ASM operations that 
have a complex and multi-tiered labour structure. 
Risks and benefits are rarely 
distributed evenly across the 
sector. Rather, benefits 
accrue to those with power, 
skills and capital — often the 
very same people that are 
able to secure formal mining 
licences. Meanwhile many 
doing the actual dirty work have no formal legal 
recognition, making them highly vulnerable. 
So formalisation needs to take a more inclusive 
approach: one that protects not merely ‘ASM 
entrepreneurs’, but also their labour force. This 
requires a better understanding of the sector’s 
employment arrangements. Here, ‘structuralist 
perspectives’ on the informal sector can help.3  
A structuralist perspective attempts to 
understand how ASM evolved within a specific 
sociopolitical environment, and within the broader 
system of production relations in the mining 
sector as a whole. 
ASM in the Philippines
This briefing reports a study of how ASM is 
organised in the Philippines,4 and a case study on 
the opportunities and challenges for developing 
policy interventions that attempt to engage and 
protect ASM-labour.5 It shows how structuralist 
perspectives provide valuable insights into the 
sector’s vested interests and power relations, and 
how risks and benefits are distributed. Not 
considering such structural realities may mean 
policies not only fail to regulate ASM’s various 
social and environmental problems and 
inequalities, but actually exacerbate them. 
Ultimately, understanding informality in ASM 
needs to integrate insights from dualist and 
legalist perspectives with a structuralist concern 
for power, inequality, and exploitation.6 
Rapid expansion
The Philippines has a long history of artisanal 
gold mining but ASM has expanded 
tremendously since the 1980s, particularly on the 
southern island of Mindanao.7 Rural livelihoods 
were in crisis, with debt-driven growth hindering 
socioeconomic development. A deteriorating 
investment climate and reduced international 
mineral demand also caused a severe crisis in 
large-scale mining, creating a pool of unemployed 
semi-skilled miners. Together with a more diverse 
group of rural poor, these miners started digging 
for gold. Initial tunnelling activities were truly 
small-scale, involving rudimentary extraction and 
processing, and equal revenue sharing among 
the miners and usually the landowner. 
Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the 
ASM sector became increasingly dominated by a 
varied group of mining financiers. They expanded 
promising tunnels and invested in more 
sophisticated processing facilities. This group 
included former miners who had struck it rich, 
local merchant and agricultural elites, army and 
rebel commanders, and engineers (often 
previously employed in large-scale mining). Over 
time, some gained key positions in the local state, 
giving them more control over the ASM sector.  
Skewed risks and benefits 
Injecting capital and professional skills into ASM 
led to an increasingly complex and multi-tiered 
labour structure, which endures today (see 
Figure 1). At the lower levels unskilled haulers, 
packers and processing plant workers work as 
day labourers for low wages, are often underage, 
and are exposed to hazardous working 
conditions. The actual diggers (abanteros) are 
organised in a corpo headed by a team leader, 
usually an experienced miner. They receive a 
percentage share, either in cash or in ore. Bigger 
tunnels also employ semi-skilled workers such as 
carpenters, explosives experts, technicians, 
portal guards, and in some cases even chemists 
and engineers. These workers often receive 
higher wages or shares, while being exempted 
from the truly dirty and dangerous work. 
But overall, revenue sharing is skewed in favour 
of financiers, who often retain between 40 and 
60 per cent of the revenues. They also control the 
processing facilities, through which they 
accumulate more income.  A broad range of 
‘rent-seekers’, including land claimants, local 
politicians, but also armed soldiers, police and 
communist rebels put further downward 
pressures on labour’s share.
This situation does not necessarily mean the 
ASM labour force is destitute. Instead, various 
informal social security mechanisms provide 
some security. Financiers may provide food and 
shelter, cash advances or even weekly stipends. 
But these are later deducted from the worker’s 
share. And financiers favour miners whose skills 
and experience put them in a good negotiating 
position. Such arrangements can be understood 
as a form of debt bondage, a way for financiers to 
immobilise a reliable supply of semi-skilled labour, 
which is otherwise continually looking for 
opportunities elsewhere. These protections are 
not accessible to unskilled haulers and packers, 
who are casual ‘day labour’.
Formalisation needs to 
take a more inclusive 
approach that protects 
the labour force
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Informality persists despite reform
In 1991, Philippine congress passed Republic 
Act 7076, or the ‘people’s small-scale mining 
act’, which let provincial and city mining 
regulatory boards create small-scale mining 
areas (Minahang Bayan), and award operating 
permits to cooperatives.8 However, complex 
registration procedures, rampant nepotism and 
rent-seeking still make formalising ASM difficult. 
Importantly, much ASM happens inside large-
scale mining concessions, making formalisation 
impossible without the explicit consent from the 
concession holder.
And even where a Minahang Bayan has been 
created, and a permit issued, membership of the 
cooperative is often limited to financiers, tunnel 
owners and/or local landowners. They use the 
cooperative as a mechanism to realise 
economies of scale, and to claim ownership of 
the mineral rights, and thus royalties from miners. 
Challenges and opportunities in 
Kematu: a case study
The ASM-area in Kematu in the municipality of 
T’Boli, South Cotabato province, began in the 
1970s. Led by local and external financiers, 
small-scale gold mining has expanded steadily. In 
August 2014 Kematu had 73 tunnels with about 
6,000 workers. Approximately 2,000 actively 
mine the tunnels (some 300 are experienced and 
professional miners). The rest haul, pack, process 
and do other mining-related activities.
In the 1990s–2000s, local and provincial 
government tried to increase control over ASM in 
Kematu by creating a Minahang Bayan and 
issuing a permit to TMBMPC, a local cooperative 
organised by financiers and landowners. But 
government efforts were uncoordinated and 
failed to stabilise the situation. In 2010, with 
tunnelling accidents and conflicts between 
different ASM operators proliferating, the 
province ordered all ASM to stop. 
In 2011 the Provincial Environmental 
Management Office (PEMO) initiated a 
programme called Minahang Bayanihan that 
requires ASM operators to apply for individual 
mining contracts, while still operating within the 
cooperative. The province combined this 
individualised mineral tenure with efforts to 
regulate employment relations. Financiers are 
now expected to secure IDs for diggers and 
motorcycle drivers for a fee collected by the 
barangay (the lowest local government unit in the 
Philippines). In the future, there will also be labour 
contracts between the financier and the diggers. 
Finally, the PEMO proposes to make financiers 
responsible for basic health and social insurance 
for the labour force. Although the Minahang 
Bayanihan is still new, our study5 identified 
several opportunities, challenges and possible 
responses.
Stakeholder benefits
1.   Workers have increased access to welfare 
benefits such as the municipal hospital, and 
official social security schemes. They are 
trained on key issues such as health and 
safety, waste management and the social 
benefits available through registration.
Carpenters, explosives experts, technicians, portal guards, chemists, engineers
Financiers, land claimants, local politicians, armed police, communist rebels
Haulers, packers, processing plant workers
‘RENT 
SEEKERS’
‘MINERS’
CASUAL 
LABOUR 
FORCE
Specialists
Team leaders
Diggers
Targeted in current 
formalisation initiatives
Not targeted in 
formalisation initiatives
Cooperatives
Corpo
Figure 1. The complex and multi-tiered labour structure in the Philippines’ artisanal and small-scale mining sector
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2.   Employers/financiers expect a more reliable 
and disciplined workforce due to the 
contractual employer-employee relationship. 
3.   Local governments increase their revenues 
(through fees paid by cooperatives and 
individual operators) and regulatory control 
over mining settlements.
Challenges and potential  
policy responses
1.   Improving state structures to monitor 
compliance. The PEMO plans to establish a 
‘multi-purpose building’ inside the mining area 
to monitor ASM. It will collaborate with national 
government agencies, the barangay and the 
cooperative, forming a ’bridge’ between the 
government and individual ASM operators. 
These positive changes must be coupled with 
efforts to improve transparency, particularly at 
the cooperative and the barangay level.
2.   Financiers’ capacity and willingness to 
shoulder additional costs are not 
addressed in the current plan. When 
production is low, financiers may be unable or 
unwilling to cut profits in order to meet their 
obligations. Policies needs to be responsive to 
these realities. 
3.   Responding to a mobile workforce. The 
Minahang Bayanihan assumes a sedentary 
workforce, but ASM is an inherently mobile 
sector. It is crucial to think how to expand the 
geographical coverage of these formalisation 
attempts. Making worker IDs valid in different 
areas could ensure collaboration across local 
authorities. 
4.   Regulatory uncertainty and mineral 
tenure conflict. At present, provincial 
governments cannot regulate ‘illegal’ ASM 
within large-scale mining concessions. To 
make ASM formalisation initiatives successful, 
it is vital to engage different government levels 
and agencies, to minimise regulatory 
inconsistencies, intra-government competition 
and overlapping mineral tenure claims.
5.   Including all the workforce. Around two 
thirds of the workforce, including those 
engaged in risky hauling and processing 
activities, fall outside the Minahang 
Bayanihan. While the ID-system was partly 
initiated to fight child labour, children still haul 
and process ore without formal protection. 
Protecting this most vulnerable and often 
exploited labour force needs policy responses 
that take an integrated and structuralist 
approach to addressing ASM’s complex social 
challenges, including issues of child labour. 
6.   Updating benefit sharing structures in 
light of regulatory changes. The Minahang 
Bayanihan does not address the issue of 
skewed benefit sharing, despite planned 
contractual arrangements between financiers 
and workers. In fact, some financiers have 
seen the programme as an opportunity to 
immobilise the workforce by imposing 
contractual obligations. Furthermore, some 
might try to shift their new costs to the labour 
force. A multi stakeholder and inclusive 
discussion should explore the impacts of the 
new regulation and whether or how to change 
the benefit sharing system.  
7.   Incorporating existing social security 
mechanisms. It is unclear how introducing 
new, formalised mechanisms for labour 
protection will affect pre-existing informal 
arrangements. Despite their flaws, these 
mechanisms do provide some workers with 
subsistence or even income security. Formal 
protection mechanisms should thoroughly 
understand existing informal mechanisms so 
as to complement or reinforce their benefits.9 
New formal rules and regulations should 
particularly preserve and maximise the 
pre-existing arrangements that benefit those 
doing the ‘dirty work’.
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